The Body Makes Language, Speech Makes the Body: A Politics of the Body in Freud (2013)

The Body Makes Language, Speech Makes the Body: A Politics of the Body in Freud

Champ Psy, 2013/2, n°64, p. 123-137.

What politics of the body can we admit in psychoanalysis and how should we formulate it? Let us draw support from a primary knowledge that psychoanalytic experience teaches us: we do not speak from any place other than that of the body, from the body and about it. But which body are we talking about? The anatomical body, the biological body, the flesh? The body as it is represented, the body image?… Psychoanalysis teaches us that it is the body that shows and is shown, upon whose surface are written fragments of truth regarding the one it permanently assigns. But it is also the body that speaks, and not only through the symptom that leads Freud down the path of the unconscious that speech carries with it—speech supported by language and conveyed by the body. Following him, we continue to take this path; we learn in his wake that the body speaks of organs, of incorporated traces; it is always determined. Thus conceived, language brings us back to the body, and it is speech that shows us in return what it does to it, to this body from which language emerges. What perspective opens up here? One where we find support for thinking about the body, the subject, desire, the unconscious; we situate therein that upon which the psychoanalyst stands; we recognize convictions, foundations, acts, and truths. But does one manage to say everything when one speaks? Can language be thought of as an agent of truth for what it designates through its practices, as nomination or even as regulation? Does the act of speech act beyond mere discourse, upon the subject, upon the body? Psychoanalysis is not sexology, nor is it linguistics; it has not delimited a single theory of language common to the different territories of its own field, and yet, language occupies and preoccupies it, if only by considering that it is through speech, and therefore within language, that it finds the path to the unconscious. Psychoanalysis has a theory of language, and even several distinct perspectives (Freud, Lacan, Green) that are more or less compatible with each other. Each carries a conception of the subject, ethics, and politics unique to it. Does there not emerge from this theory of language a kind of politics of the body, which would give shape to its effects? What would be, for psychoanalysis, and for Freud in particular, a politics of the body that remains to be deduced from his propositions on language?

As Saussure says (Saussure F., 1916), we have only points of view on language, which are never without ethical or political consequences; from these points of view, the body finds itself affected, especially if we admit that political and ethical views tend to formulate, restrict, or control the body (Foucault M., 1979). Henri Meschonnic extends this analysis when, based on a critique of the sign, he develops the following: “[…] language must be thought against the sign as representation, and it must be shown that the sign is only a representation of language. For the sign taken for the nature and truth of language prevents it from being recognized as a representation. A point of view. […]. The sign prevents thinking about the continuum, the language-poem-ethics-politics interaction. The sign is discontinuous. It is theological-essentialist. It allows for the thinking of neither the subject nor the poem.” (Meschonnic H., 2012, p. 717). This is an eminently political and ethical proposition, which Meschonnic reformulates here again, firmly inscribing the relationship between language and the body as social and political stakes: “Modernization confused with modernity [modernity as presence in the present and this very recognition] has also brought its essentializations to the crisis. It can be seen in terms of a renewal of the conflict between realism and nominalism. The industrialization of death and its massification by totalitarianisms have also eroded speech by forbidding speech. We are only beginning to think about it. […] what I call the continuum, through and against the discontinuous [the sign]. It is the continuum between language and the body, between language and ethics, language and politics. The discontinuous retains its empirical relevance. But within the limits, which are those of the concepts of language, the concepts of the sign. But the discontinuity of the sign presents itself as the entire and unique nature of language, coextensive with its practices and its thought, whereas it is only a partial representation, which prevents, through its alleged universality, an understanding of all that we do with language and what it does to us.” (Meschonnic H., 2012, p. 722). There is therefore no theory of language that does not induce or reflect a conception of the subject and the possibilities of their existence, of their psychic and bodily recognition. What then do we know of what we consider to be a conception of language in Freud, in an attempt to identify and formulate what a possible politics of the body for psychoanalysis would be?

FREUD AND THE “LANGUAGE APPARATUS”

When considering language in Freud, two main notions emerge: word-presentation (Wortvorstel-lungen) and thing-presentation (Dingvorstellungen). Their use by Freud appears in On Aphasia: A Critical Study (Freud S., 1891). This is his first work devoted to speech-related disorders; in it, Freud delivers his ideas on the “language apparatus” and some of his conceptions regarding words that he would revisit and refine over time. The articulation of the body to speech is fully present from his earliest formulations:

“We can have no sensation without immediately associating it,” where we understand that the body pushes toward speech. “[…] to the word corresponds a complicated associative process where elements of visual, acoustic, and kinesthetic origin enter into connection with one another. The word acquires its meaning, however, through connection with the ‘object-presentation’ […]. The object-presentation itself, on the other hand, is an associative complex consisting of the most heterogeneous visual, acoustic, tactile, kinesthetic, and other presentations.” (Freud S., 1891). Keeping in mind that what we translate as “word” is present in the Freudian text under the signifier “wort,” which borders on both word and speech in German usage. And that Freud makes alternating use in his various texts between Wort and Wortvorstellung, between word and word-presentation. Thing-presentations and word-presentations are thought of by Freud as belonging, for the former, to the unconscious and, for the latter, to the preconscious system, in the vision of the first topography; the connection of the word-presentation with the thing-presentation also being of the preconscious and capable of being activated from the unconscious to consciousness; they are distinguished from each other as belonging to primary processes or secondary processes. But as we have seen, the distinction between the two cannot be thought of in analogy to Saussure’s signifier/signified, because beyond the sound imprint of the word, Freud also associates determinants that are inscribed in the psyche more broadly than Saussure, such as the visual image made of the image of reading the word and the image of writing it, or even the image of the movement of the word in its pronunciation which solicits the organs of phonation. The points of view, thus qualified by Saussure, are therefore quickly very different, disparate, and heterogeneous.

In this same text, he continues: “[…] the connection between the word-presentation and the object-presentation is the most exhaustible part of the language operation, its weak point as it were.” (Freud S., 1891). This invites reflection on the potential psychic transformations and reworkings that Freud, moreover, hopes for and announces: “At present, we are also beginning to understand the ‘magic’ of the word. Words are indeed the most important instruments of the influence that one person seeks to exert over another; words are good means for provoking psychic modifications in the one to whom they are addressed, and that is why there is henceforth nothing enigmatic in the statement that the magic of the word can ward off morbid phenomena, particularly those which themselves have their foundation in psychic states.” (Freud S., 1891). We perceive here how his conception in terms of “presentation of” already carries his therapeutic intuitions and intentions. Indeed, a connection operates between the presentations in the psyche of what things and words achieve on the individual and on their body. It is interesting to observe that the thing in itself and the word in itself retain a relative existence outside of their respective presentations in the psyche. Here takes shape the possibility of a confrontation with later or more recent models proposed by Saussure’s linguistics, then Lacan’s reworking of the Saussurean signifier when the word as such, notably, is taken as an object, which Freud also encounters in children and schizophrenics of whom he says they sometimes “treat” words as “objects.” Further still, Freud’s conception here is absolutely not incompatible with a certain aspect of the performative dimension of discourse, in the sense of the power of words to act (Austin

1. L., 1962). We find an illustration of this in our reading here: “The reaction of the subject who suffers some damage has a truly ‘cathartic’ effect only when it is truly adequate, as in revenge. But the human being finds in language an equivalent of the act, an equivalent thanks to which the affect can be ‘abreasted’ in much the same way. In other cases, it is the words themselves that constitute the adequate reflex, for example, complaints, the revelation of a burdensome secret (confession). When this kind of reaction through act, speech and, in the mildest cases, through tears, does not occur, the memory of the event retains all its affective value.” (Freud S., Breuer J., 1893). Freud explains that speech and words are capable of achieving the liquidation, the abreaction of the affect linked to an event, just as concrete liquidation in acts does. We can then think that what passes through language is equivalent to what passes through the body, at least in terms of affective liquidation. This regime of equivalence proposed by Freud offers a glimpse, beyond a therapeutic lever, of the representation of the body through language, when speech carries the affect and contributes to its psychic processing: language as a field of inscription and extension of the bodily.

In The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud returns to this power of words to act, distinguishing: “Quite right, it would be a process of enchantment if the action were swifter. Enchantment has as its essential attribute the rapidity, not to say the suddenness, of success. But analytical treatments require months, and even years; such a slow enchantment loses its character of the marvelous. Let us not, moreover, despise the word. It is after all a powerful instrument, it is the means by which we reveal our feelings to one another, the way by which we gain influence over the other. Words can do unspeakable good and inflict terrible wounds. Assuredly, in the very beginning was the deed, the word came later; it was in many respects a cultural progress when the deed was moderated by becoming a word. But after all, the word was originally an enchantment, a magical action, and it has still preserved much of its ancient force.” (Freud S., 1926). The force of the word is thus linked to the very origin of language, to the necessity for words to take over from acts and which, in doing so, were invested with their force to act. Freud recognizes in dreams—in the language of dreams—the virtues of primitive languages that know neither negation nor contradiction. “Thus, for example, negation is never specifically indicated in the language of dreams. Opposites take each other’s place in the dream content and are presented by the same element. Or as one might also say: in the language of dreams, concepts are still ambivalent, they unite within themselves opposite meanings, as was the case, according to the hypotheses of linguists, in the oldest roots of historical languages. Another striking character of our dream language is the very frequent use of symbols which allow, to a certain extent, a translation of the dream content, independently of individual associations.” (Freud S., 1913). Drawing on the linguistic discoveries of the time regarding primitive languages, Freud develops and confirms his analogical conception with the language of dreams and the necessity, in order to interpret them, of following very closely the evolution of language through time, of returning to original languages. What were the first words? To what origins can we trace them? Freud refers to theses attributing sexual origins to the first words of the first languages. In The Interpretation of Dreams, regarding symbols, Freud explains: “In a whole series of cases, the element common to the symbol and the thing-proper in whose place the latter comes is patent, in others it is hidden; the choice of the symbol then appears enigmatic. It is precisely these cases that will not fail to throw light on the ultimate meaning of the symbolic relation; they

refer to the fact that this relation is genetic. What is today symbolically linked was likely, in original times, united by a conceptual and linguistic identity.” (Freud S., 1900). He adds here, in 1925, a footnote: “[Dr. Hans Sperber, who published a text entitled ‘On the Influence of Sexual Factors on the Origin and Development of Language,’ in the journal Imago, No. 1, in 1912] considers that all original words designated sexual things and that they subsequently lost this sexual meaning by passing to other things and activities, which were compared to sexual things and activities.”.

This invites us to question whether words, retaining their capacity for action as witnesses of past actions, carry within them the mark and competence of the sexual acts to which they are originally linked, and whether the power of words to act has substituted for liquidation in concrete action? Not that one should see a systematic analogy of supposed sexual acts in the sense of coitus, but of the sexual charge inherent in interpersonal relations where the Freudian sexual is considered, illustrating human psychosexuality. Furthermore, when Freud evokes the use of symbols as traversing language beyond individual associative schemes, we are invited to think, for example, of the question of sexual identities as symbols, for no one today would dispute that ‘man’ or

‘woman’ are symbols, so much does their tracking function operate beyond the personal appreciation one has of them or the translation devolved to them. Thus, when sexual identity is spoken, does it not commit a kind of tautology of content, a repetition or a doubling of its capacity for action or equivalent of action of a sexual nature? Why distinguish and specifically highlight sexual identity in language with symbols, since words carry within them the traces of the sexual act or the sexual thing, if not to distinguish oneself from it in turn, as words can allow? The redundancy and overlap of words of sex can in this way be thought of as operations of regulation, of delimitation of sex in act and sex as thing, arrangements of the sexual positions of each other, seeking to say and unsay what of words belongs to them from sex, from the origins, and which they must attempt to dispose of in an attempt at subjective freedom.

To state a sexual identity is to state a sexual act, a thing of sex, and the place one occupies in this matter, its effects, the claims or demands it inspires; it is to organize sex in accordance, or nearly so, with what has been defined in history; it is also to give a limitation, through form, to the sexual, where narcissism takes charge of pinning down its course to make it happen at the rank of subjective support. Speaking amounts to situating oneself in the affairs of sex without this needing to be the object of manifest speech. Fundamentally, something here can translate a kind of definition of psychoanalysis as treatment, namely that it is a matter, as far as we understand it, of giving thanks to this truth of language and therefore of individual speech: the truth of opposite meanings and the truth of the sexual in act and in thing. Do we not find there what the psychoanalytic cure reserves as a fate for the language of each person, to return to one’s own ambiguities and sexual contents to detect therein that kind of destiny that presides over the desire of each, to reopen a path of subjective construction? In this, Freud’s vision responds indirectly to the ethical and political concern that Meschonnic places on language and its powers. We can think here that a kind of politics of sex made of nomination, regulation, and delimitation is indeed identified by Freud when he examines the ‘language apparatus,’ at the intersection of the symptom, the symbol, the dream, and the slip of the tongue. Freud, without speaking of identities, expresses something that we can perhaps relate to them, if we admit that identities behave somewhat like symbols. And when identities seem to want to address the questions of what we designate by sexual identities, we guess how the effort of circumscription they contain compromises just as much as it guarantees the necessity of saying and of nominating the subject.

We find Freud’s interest in symbolic representation in Moses and Monotheism: “There is first the universality of symbolism […]. It is a matter of original knowledge that the adult has subsequently forgotten. It is true that he uses the same symbols in dreams, but he does not understand them if the analyst does not interpret them for him, and even then he does not readily grant belief to this translation. […] Symbolism also lies beyond the diversities of languages; investigations would likely show that it is ubiquitous, the same among all peoples. It seems, therefore, that we are here in the presence of an assured case of archaic inheritance from the time when language was developing, but another explanation could still be attempted. One could say that it is a matter of thought relations between presentations that had been established during the historical development of language and which must now necessarily be repeated each time an individual development of language takes place. It would then be a case of hereditary transmission of a thought disposition, as is encountered elsewhere of a drive disposition, and which would still not be a new contribution to our problem.” (Freud S., 1939). Access to the individual development of language is thus achieved in a transmission that runs alongside the original and the repetition of this link between the original presentation and the current presentation. Thought of in this movement, the stating of sexual identity—as it appears in modernity in profusion and innovation—seems to approach the development of individual language, imbued with ancient heritages dating from the development of the common language and which, like symbols, demand to be questioned to know what the symbolic representation of one object for another perhaps knows of transformation with the evolutions of language as they undoubtedly occur constantly, and for each person as Freud emphasizes. Would the current renewal of figures of sexual identities not stem from this? From a transformation of the symbols of language necessitating, for some time, adjustments of individual uses of these same symbols, more global renovations? An interrogation through speech, which is a practice of language, of a politics? Decline, transformation, evolution, progress? Each novelty of individual languages projecting us to the threshold of collective evolutions by way of the mutable symbolic representation in the singular recovery that seizes it. We can formulate that this carves out the perimeter of an identity expression traversed by the foundations of language and the characters of its transmission. Freud’s conception of language, while not a theory of language strictly speaking, nonetheless remains a conception from which we can extract a politics when it can be translated into practices that name, describe, regulate, and delimit uses, objects, products. Without losing sight of the fact that language engages the body to receive its inscription and extension, as we formulated previously.

ABOUT THE BODY IN FREUD

Let us first observe that the occurrences of the body in Freud’s work are largely linked to those of language. The body is thought of starting from the sufferings of hysteria, for example, whose body speaks for Freud, since it is thus that he tracks the symptom to unconscious knowledge. A surface for the appearance of phenomena or the realization of other phenomena, the Freudian body is erotic; the body is a plural erogenous zone where sexual practice sees its existence articulated to the election or abandonment of certain zones of the body according to what we can consider to be presentations: “The zones which in the normal and mature man no longer produce sexual unbinding [Freud means by this: ‘a kind of secretion which is exactly felt as the internal state of the libido’] are then necessarily the anal region and the bucco-pharyngeal area. This is understood in two ways: first, the sight and the presentation one has of them no longer have an exciting effect; second, the internal sensations emanating from them do not provide a contribution to the libido, like those coming from the sexual organs proper. In animals, these sexual zones continue to be in force in both these aspects; when this persists in the human being, there appears… perversion.” (Freud S., 1897). This unbinding, which works for the effort of civilization if one notes the animal reference, acts as a kind of “normal repression” allowing some symptoms to appear, such as “disgust,” a vestige of the unbinding operation which itself “passes into oblivion.” He continues: “One must suppose that in infancy sexual unbinding is not yet as localized as it will be later, so that here too these zones abandoned later (perhaps the entire surface of the body as well) arouse in some way something analogous to later sexual unbinding. The disappearance of these initial sexual zones would have its counterpart in the resorption of certain internal organs during development.” Freud suggests here that the establishment of development makes possible not only the abandonment of certain sexual zones in favor of other zones with a reorganization of the libido indexed to certain more favorable presentations, but that this arrangement can support even the resorption of certain organs during development. How to understand this? Freud evokes what, in the course of human development, has caused progressive transformations causing certain zones and their functions—even the organ—to be “resorbed”; this is “organic repression.” Freud relies notably on the transition to upright walking which, by moving the nose away from certain “interesting” sensations, caused them to become “repugnant.” This notion of organic repression allows us to think, since the question of presentations is not detached from it, that the language accompanying these evolutions has also recorded the transformations of the body within it, building step by step a common dimension of the bodily that we interpret as the premises of a politics of the body as a cultural product.

We thus see the reappearance of the question of presentations, of memory traces that here engage the marking and imprint made on the body by the elements of language, the body perceived as a place of inscription for past stimulations. The physiological and psychic articulation of the body and language finds a major development here in psychoanalytic elaboration. How does Freud establish the link between these two dimensions whose economic and dynamic proximity he affirms, and whose renewal he would later state in the second topography? He deduces the drive, this

“limit concept between the psychic and the somatic, the psychic representative of excitations, of stimuli originating from within the body and reaching the psyche, as a measure of the demand for work imposed on the psyche as a consequence of its connection to the bodily.” (Freud S., 1915). The body is therefore definitely not reducible to anatomy, and Freud reaffirms here his attachment to the biological, which for him constitutes a true model of inspiration for the living. Let us continue with his conception of the drive, which Freud distinguishes from physiological excitation: “Drive excitation does not come from the external world [unlike the model of physiological excitation] but from within the organism itself. That is why it also acts differently on the psyche and requires, to be eliminated, other actions. […]

The drive, on the contrary, never acts as a momentary impact force but always as a constant force. And since it does not attack from the outside but from within the body, there is no flight that can serve against it. There exists a better term than that of drive excitation: that of ‘need’; what suppresses this need is

‘satisfaction.’ It can only be obtained by a modification conforming to the intended (adequate) goal of the internal source of excitation.”. The body, subjected to the drive regime, is a body that transforms, experiences, and is charged and soothed by the tensions traversing it. The drive, of intra-somatic source, is distinguished from the ordinary stimulus coming from the outside. If the drive is the psychic representation of this internal stimulus and if we also know that presentations or memory traces are mobilized in obtaining sexual discharges, we have some difficulty concluding with Freud on the relationship between drive and language. Perhaps there is none that can be written entirely? However, we know that the perspective in representation of words, things, and the drive—three presentations in the psyche—allows for the elaboration of the defense processes of neuro-psychoses in particular. When the presentation is, through defense, detached from the affect, then the prior charge is carried elsewhere—to the body in hysterical conversion, for example (Freud S., 1894)—from an internal reorganization in which we can read a form of regulation of the drive toward another object, another presentation, but in alignment with its goal.

Does the drive have more affinity with the thing-presentation or the word-presentation? We are tempted to say that it is closer to the thing-presentation due to its connection to the word-presentation through its “sensitive extremity” (Freud S., 1891); through its mediation, the drive can come to interfere, to carve a path to the place of language, and thus to the word-presentation, to create a disturbance, pronunciation difficulties, a slip of the tongue. This proximity between drive and thing-presentations—linked to the unconscious system—can also be supported by the vision of Freud’s second topography (1920), where the “Id” is the reservoir of drives. Language is then a kind of surface or field where that of the body which the drive can account for can come to be deposited and inscribed. But if we read this proposition by Freud: “In the emergence of the ego and in its separation from the id, another factor than the influence of the Pc system seems still to play a role. One’s own body, and above all the surface, a place from which internal and external perceptions can originate simultaneously. It is seen as another object, but produces two kinds of sensations to the touch, one of which can be equivalent to an internal sensation.” (Freud S., 1922), can we not see the surface of the body as the place of language, as the very place of expression of the “language apparatus,” the latter being able to designate the “psychic apparatus”? And is this perspective not reinforced, in this same text, when Freud proposes to say what the ego is: “The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface [Freud adds in 1927, a note to the English translation: ‘The ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the surface of the mental apparatus.’]”.

TO CONCLUDE

What have we learned with Freud about the body, language, and their relationship? We know with him that the body is not free from the drive, from what at its heart exposes it to the drive regime and the necessity of its satisfaction. The ego itself, a projected bodily surface, is subject to this drive regime. The body is invested, represented, reworked, repressed, or elected according to whether it conforms to the expectations of development or social stakes. We also know that language is a projected surface where the body finds its inscription, and where the drive is exposed in word-presentations. Speaking says as much as it does, unless saying is not an action in itself, which psychoanalytic experience radically denies. And what is said says nothing other than sex—original experience—in its bodily dimension; such is the body that the approach to language through psychoanalysis allows us to think. In other words, a path of access to the drive opens up through the fact of language which, in return, testifies to the arrangements that its integration for each individual occasions in terms of connections, or possible sexual unbindings, toward new recompositions of the body and the drive that find themselves affected. This is the therapeutic path envisaged by Freud where we can interpret speech as eminently political in regard to the body and what assigns it from the unconscious, from the common language. If the body is nothing without the language that represents and transforms it, there is no language that is not of the body; that the subject can go as far as autism proves it to us.

What can we deduce and develop from this? By recognizing the psychic apparatus, Freud recognizes the place of freedom at the heart of constraint. When an individual speaks, we can say that a body speaks; it speaks only of what the body experiences under the drive regime, unconsciously determined, which nonetheless passes through consciousness, in a distribution of psychic functions and psychic places and psychic objects that integrate the results of culture, an effort of individual evolution, itself integrated into the collective effort. The new sexual figures or the new symptoms that appear and question us repeat to us a piece of the history of our language, of its actualization always at work; they tell us the present of bodies that integrate and testify to showing it, the evolution of the collective language that translates our perpetual adaptation to sexual things and actions. Since Freud, we know that if sexual things and actions have their effect on language, language in turn influences sexual things and actions; the body taking its place as a product and contingent of this arrangement. Without possible circularity, this circulation nevertheless forces us to think of an imperfect reciprocity that we formulate thus: the body makes language, speech makes the body. In the hollow of this asymmetry that Freud invites us to experience and to think is founded the impossible closure where analysis appears and where the analyst finds support, where he takes the measure, by posing it as such, of the political responsibility of his act in regard to the things of sex. This characterizes, from our point of view, a politics of the body, or what we allow ourselves to think in these terms, for psychoanalysis.

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